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ABSTRACT
Transboundary resource disputes are often
analyzed by reference to two nebulous and conflicting
principles that have emerged in international
environmental law: “equitable and reasonable
utilization” and “no significant harm.” Frequently
overlooked in this context is the potential value of other
canons of international law—especially human rights
law, criminal law, and the rules governing the use of
force—in adding definition to the muddled contours of
these foundational precepts. This Article therefore
undertakes an assessment of sovereign rights and
obligations regarding shared natural resources which
arise from these other bodies of law. In doing so, it
offers new lenses through which to evaluate competing
state resource claims. It also provides fresh perspective
on longstanding controversies in international law
relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction, conflict of
rights, and non-military attacks or uses of force.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2021, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan returned to the
bargaining table for talks related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam (“GERD”), the latest episode in a protracted negotiation that has
stretched on for nearly a decade. After two days of meetings, the
trilateral initiative sputtered and was followed by renewed appeals for
international intervention.1
*_ Eian Katz is a Legal and Policy Analyst at Canmore Company. He
previously served as Counsel at Public International Law and Policy Group. He
holds a JD from the University of Chicago and a BA from Yale University.
1
Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia Talks Over Nile Dam Fail, AL JAZEERA (Apr.
6, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/6/sudan-says-ethiopias-moveson-nile-dam-violate-international-law; Nile Dam Dispute Could be Heading to
Security Council, AL MONITOR (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.almonitor.com/originals/2021/04/nile-dam-dispute-could-be-heading-securitycouncil.
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The GERD is a massive infrastructure project which, upon its
expected completion in 2023, promises to more than double Ethiopia’s
installed energy capacity in a country in which 65 million people lack
electricity.2 In Ethiopia, the dam has been transformed into a national
symbol, extolled in song by its most popular musical artist3 and in
verse by its political leaders.4
In downriver Egypt and Sudan, by contrast, the outlook is far
dimmer. Egypt is particularly dependent upon the Nile—the river
supplies 90% of its fresh water5 and 90% of all Egyptians call its valley
home.6 Already facing a critical water shortage, Egypt believes that
that damming the Nile will exacerbate this scarcity and endanger
farmland that accounts for two-thirds of its food production.7 With
these grim consequences portended, Cairo has characterized the
GERD as an existential threat.8 Despite the stakes, ongoing efforts to
resolve the controversy have repeatedly foundered.
The Nile River is but one example of a resource shared by
multiple sovereigns. Throughout the world, many rivers, lakes,
aquifers, forests, fish and wildlife populations, and oil, gas, and
mineral deposits—not to mention the air we breathe—traverse national
borders. Interstate disagreements over the use of these resources is
2
U.N. Sec, Council, Annex to the letter dated 14 May 2020 from the
Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council 6, 11, U.N. Doc. S/2020/409 (May 15, 2020).
3
Teddy Afro: How Do We Negotiate over the Nile?, ETHIOPIAN MONITOR
(Aug. 4, 2020), https://ethiopianmonitor.com/2020/08/04/teddy-afro-how-do-wenegotiate-over-the-nile/.
4
Max Bearak and Sudarsan Raghavan, Africa’s Largest Dam Powers
Dreams of Prosperity in Ethiopia and Fears of Hunger in Egypt, WASH. POST (Oct.
15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grandethiopian-renaissance-dam-egypt-nile/.
5
Egypt to Withdraw from Latest Nile Dam Talks for Consultations, AL
JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/5/egypt-towithdraw-from-latest-nile-dam-talks-for-consultations.
6
Magdi Abdelhadi, Nile Dam Row: Egypt Fumes as Ethiopia Celebrates,
BBC (July 29, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53573154.
7
Eric Knecht and Maha El Dahan, Egypt’s Rice Farmers See Rough
Times Downstream of New Nile Mega-Dam, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-rice-insight-idUSKBN1HU1O0; Bearak
and Raghavan, supra note 4.
8
Egypt Warns of ‘Existential Threat’ from Ethiopia Dam, AL JAZEERA
(June 30, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/6/30/egypt-warns-ofexistential-threat-from-ethiopia-dam.
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commonplace; in recent decades, conflict has flared on the banks of
the Indus, Mekong, and Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.9 Climate change
only threatens to exacerbate scarcities and competition.
The prominence and gravity of interstate resource disputes
notwithstanding, the applicable law remains shrouded in
indeterminacy. For more than a century, the Westphalian international
system has struggled to accommodate a reality in which resource
ownership can be collective rather than exclusive to the territorial
sovereign. This effort has resulted in the development of two nebulous
and sometimes-inconsistent principles in treaty and customary law.
The first is the sovereign right of states to “equitable and reasonable
utilization” (“ERU”) of transboundary resources. The second is a
reciprocal obligation to cause “no significant harm” (“NSH”) to other
states reliant upon the same resource. Lingering uncertainties as to the
meaning of these terms and their interrelation has made law an
inadequate tool in resolving disputes over shared natural resources.
Much scholarship has been produced attempting to bring
clarity to the hazy concepts of ERU and NSH. However, the literature
has largely undertheorized the responsibilities of plural resource
sovereigns that derive from other sources of public international law.
Regardless of their compliance with ERU and NSH, states may not
utilize resources in a manner that would violate their other
international obligations. This Article suggests that transboundary
resource utilization may in fact be limited by international human
rights law, international criminal law, and the UN Charter’s general
prohibition of the use of force. A fuller realization of these limitations
may inform the understanding of ERU and NSH.
At the same time, the transnational character of certain
resources challenges bodies of law predicated on fixed state borders.
This challenge mirrors that posed by other transboundary threats, like
pollution and disease. For these branches of law to remain relevant in
a changing threat environment, they must develop responses to these
emerging issues. This Article therefore also explores where these
responses are needed and what form they might take, with a focus on

9
Noa Tann and Madeline Flamik, Interstate Dam Disputes Threaten
Global Security, AM. SEC. PROJECT (Aug. 2018),
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Ref-0215Interstate-Dam-Disputes.pdf.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction, conflict of rights, and non-military or nonkinetic attacks or uses of force.
Part I reviews the origins and contested meanings of the two
leading precepts governing the usage of shared natural resources:
equitable and reasonable utilization and no significant harm. Part II
then considers scenarios in which the misuse of transboundary
resources may violate international human rights law, international
criminal law, or the UN Charter’s presumptive ban on the use of force.
Part III comments on the implications of this analysis for the
management of shared resources and for the evolution of these
corpuses of law.
I.

MURKY WATERS: UTILIZATION AND HARM

Much of international environmental law has been inspired by
and shaped in response to “the impact that activities in one territory
may have on the territory of another.”10 As the international
community began to turn its attention to the particular issue of natural
resources shared between two or more states, it coalesced early on
around the idea that one state’s usage should not be to the detriment of
another state.11 This basic notion derives from and is sometimes
rendered as the Roman Law maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, or “use your own property in such a way that you do not injure
that of others.” During the 20th century, “no significant harm” (“NSH”)
formed the underlying principle for a raft of subsequent agreements
focusing on the conservation of the natural environment.12
Along with the responsibility to do no significant harm,
international law later came to recognize a corresponding right to
development that includes “full permanent sovereignty… over all…
Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Ry. (Belgium v. Netherlands), 27 R.I.A.A.
35, para. 222 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/477.
11
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
REGARDING THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES FOR PURPOSES OTHER
THAN NAVIGATION—DECLARATION OF MADRID 365 (Apr. 20, 1911).
12
See, e.g. U.N. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/164/37, art. 7 (Sept. 8, 1995);
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, art. 5
(June 23, 1979); Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat, art. 4 (Feb. 2, 1971).
10
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natural resources.”13 The principle of “equitable and reasonable
utilization” (“ERU”) was conceived as a means to reconcile the
apparent conflict between sovereign rights and sovereign duties
respecting resources shared among multiple states. Yet NSH and ERU
remain somewhat muddled both in their individual meanings and in
their interaction. This Part briefly summarizes the origins of each and
the enduring tensions and ambiguities.
A. No Significant Harm
The common law principle of sic utere tuo has been applied
extensively in environmental law.14 In several treaties, it is framed as
an absolute duty not to “cause damage to the environment of other
states” from activity originating within a state’s jurisdiction or
control.15 In more recent sources, this has been softened to an
obligation not to cause “significant harm,” and to mitigate such harm
once inflicted.16 A “significant harm” is one that is more than merely
“detectable,” but less intense than a “serious” or “substantial” harm.17
When there is a violation of the NSH mandate, relevant treaties
and draft conventions impose liability upon states in accordance with

13
See G. A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, art. 2 (Dec. 12, 1974); see also G. A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right
to Development, art. 1 (Dec. 4, 1986).
14
T.R. Subramanya and Shuvro Prosun Sarker, Emergence of Principle of
Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non-Laedes in Environmental Law and Its Endorsement
by International and National Courts: An Assessment, 5 KATHMANDU L. REV. 1,
5–8 (2017).
15
G. A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, art. 30 (Dec. 12, 1974); UN Environment Programme, Draft Principles in
the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and
Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/GC.6/CRP.2, principle 3.1 (May 19, 1978); Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, principle 2 (Aug. 12,
1992).
16
See Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, art. 7 (May 21, 1997); Draft Articles on the Law of
Transboundary Aquifers, with Commentaries, art. 6, ILC 60th Sess. (2008); see also
International Law Commission, Protection of the Atmosphere: Texts and Titles of
Draft Guidelines and Preamble Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First
Reading, guideline 3, 70th Sess. (June 6 2018).
17
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 30 (2008).
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applicable international law.18 The pertinent customary rules are
compiled in the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft
Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities, which concern “activities not prohibited by international
law which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm
through their physical consequences.”19 The draft articles describe the
subject risk threshold as “a high probability of causing significant
transboundary harm and a low probability of causing disastrous
transboundary harm.”20 States must take “all appropriate measures” to
minimize such risks.21 According to a complementary set of ILC draft
principles, when damage is caused by hazardous activities the
responsible state must provide “prompt and adequate compensation to
victims.”22
B. Equitable and Reasonable Utilization
One of the earliest expressions of what would become the ERU
principle appears in the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States: “In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or
more countries, each State must co-operate… in order to achieve
optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the
legitimate interest of others.”23 In draft principles produced by the UN
Environment Programme (“UNEP”) a few years later, this language is
updated to require interstate cooperation “consistent with the concept
of equitable utilization of shared natural resources.”24 In various
sources, ERU has also been alternately stylized as “optimum” or
“sustainable” utilization.25
The concept of ERU has been adopted in treaty instruments for
many different applications. Certain regional agreements concerning
18
G. A. Dec. UNEP/GC.6/CRP.2, principle 12.1 (May 19, 1978); Int’l
Law Comm’n, supra note 17, at 42.
19
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary
Harm from Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries, art. 1, 53rd Sess. (2001).
20
Id. art. 2(a).
21
Id. art. 3.
22
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the
Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, with
Commentaries, U.N. Doc A/61/10, at principle 4, 58th Sess. (2006).
23
G. A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), at 3, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States (Dec. 12, 1974).
24
G. A. Dec. 3129, supra note 18 (principle 1).
25
Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 17, at 28.
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shared resources, such as the Amazon rainforest or the Colorado, Rio
Grande, and Tijuana rivers, mandate a “rational utilization” or an
“equitable distribution” of waters among state parties.26 The UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) charges coastal states
with promoting the “optimum utilization” of living resources within
the exclusive economic zones surrounding their shores.27 ERU has also
been incorporated into treaties and draft conventions governing the
global usage of specific types of resources, such as migratory fish,28
transnational waterways,29 drainage basins,30 aquifers,31 and the
atmosphere.32
The fullest articulation of ERU is given in the Convention on
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
(“UNWC”), which entered into force in 2014. “Equitable and
reasonable utilization” is described there as fostering the upstream
watercourse state’s “optimal and sustainable utilization…, taking into
account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent
with the adequate protection of the watercourse.”33 This
characterization illustrates that ERU contains both a right to make
productive use of the resource and a restraint on that right. The UNWC
drafters explain that “equitable” does not necessarily mean
quantitatively equal proportions, but rather qualitatively equal rights

26
Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, art. 5, July 3, 1978, 1202 U.N.T.S.
19194; Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, art. 16, Mex.-U.S., Feb 3, 1944, T.S. No. 994.
27
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 62, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
28
U. N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/164/37, preamble & art. 5 (Sept. 8, 1995) (calling
on parties to achieve “optimum utilization” and to avoid “overutilization”).
29
, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, art. 5, May 21, 1997, G.A. Res. 51/229 [hereinafter International
Watercourses].
30
Int’l Law Comm’n, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers, arts. 4 &5 (Aug. 1996) [hereinafter The Helsinki Rules].
31
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers, with Commentaries, art. 4, 60th Sess. (2008).
32
Int’l Law Comm’n, Protection of the Atmosphere: Texts and Titles of
Draft Guidelines and Preamble Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First
Reading, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at guideline 6, (2018).
33
International Watercourses, supra note 29, at art. 5(1).
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in consideration of each interested state’s circumstances.34
“Reasonable,” in turn, requires taking measures to maximize the
benefits accruing to all states.35
The UNWC and other sources set forth a non-exhaustive set of
factors bearing on the equity and reasonableness of utilization,
including a) geographic, climatic, and ecological considerations, b)
social and economic needs, c) dependent populations, d) downstream
effects, e) existing and potential uses, f) conservation and
development, and g) alternative uses.36 These factors are to be
weighted according to their relative importance under the
circumstances, allowing for flexibility in application.37
C. Tensions and Ambiguities
Despite this evaluative guidance, the contours of the ERU
principle remain contested and poorly defined in international law.
Textual sources provide little instruction as to the application of the
multi-factor test when a conflict of uses arises. Treaty and customary
law dictate that the relative weights are to be assigned case by case,
with special regard for “vital human needs.”38 But without clearer
guidance as to their prioritization, these criteria have been described
as of “limited utility” in practice.39 Vagueness as to the substance of
ERU has led to disagreements between resource-sharing states, “while
not providing any tools for resolving [them].”40
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses and Commentaries Thereto and Resolution on
Transboundary Confined Groundwater, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.492, Corr.1, Corr.2,
Corr.3 and Add.1 at 98 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Articles on the Law of NonNavigational Uses].
35
Id. at 97.
36
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, art. 6 (May 21, 1997), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229. See also Int’l Law
Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, with
Commentaries, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/63/10 at 22, (2008); The Helsinki Rules, supra
note 30, at art. 5.
37
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, art. 6 (May 21, 1997), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229.
38
International Watercourses, art. 10, supra note 29.
39
Bruce Lankford, Does Article 6 (Factors Relevant to Equitable and
Reasonable Utilization) in the UN Watercourses Convention Misdirect Riparian
Countries?, 38 WATER INT’L 130, 130 (2013).
40
Itay Fischhendler, Ambiguity in Transboundary Environmental Dispute
Resolution: The Israel-Jordanian Water Agreement, 45 J. PEACE RSCH. 80 (2008).
34
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Further ambiguity clouds ERU’s relational status in respect to
NSH. The inherent tension between these principles figures
prominently in resource disputes, with states undertaking development
projects appealing to the ERU as a reasonableness standard while
impacted neighboring states champion NSH as a rule of strict
liability.41 Historically, sic utere predominated, with the concept of
ERU only developing in the mid-20th century.42 Many treaties still give
preference to existing uses, thereby acting to preserve the status quo.43
More recently, however, ERU has overtaken NSH in precedence by
most estimations, labeled as the “guiding criterion” by the drafters of
the UNWC.44 The UNWC consequently prescribes a balancing of
interests in which the harm caused is one factor among many.45 To
accommodate this reordering, “harm” has been reinterpreted as “legal
harm” rather than “factual harm.”46
International courts and tribunals have also wrestled with the
contradiction to little avail. In the International Court of Justice’s
(“ICJ”) 1997 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, it trumpeted ERU to the
diminution of the no-harm principle.47 However, in its 2010 Pulp Mills
decision, the Court leaned heavily on sic utere.48 With no judicial or
scholarly consensus emerging, the interplay between the two
principles remains “uncertain and confused” and “susceptible to
contradictory interpretations.”49 As a result, lack of clarity as to how
ERU and NSH assign property rights in natural resources has been at
the heart of the legal dispute over the GERD.50
41

Sharmila L. Murthy and Fatima Mendikulova, Water, Conflict, and
Cooperation in Central Asia: The Role of International Law and Deiplomacy, 18
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 400, 411–12 (2017).
42
Tamar Meshel, Swimming Against the Current: Revisiting Principles of
International Water Law in the Resolution of Fresh Water Disputes, 61 HARV.
INT’L L. REV. 135, 152–54 (2020).
43
Murthy and Mendikulova, supra note 41, at 411.
44
Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses, supra note 34, at
103.
45
Id.
46
Meshel, supra note 42, at 154-57.
47
Id. at 157 (citing Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),
1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25)).
48
Id. at 157–58 (citing Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Argentina v.
Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 14, paras. 175, 177 (Apr. 20)).
49
Id. at 141.
50
Rawia Tawfik & Ines Dombrowsky, GERD and Hydropolitics in the
Eastern Nile: From Water-Sharing to Benefit-Sharing? in Ana Elisa Cascão,
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FURTHER SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

ERU and NSH might be said together to comprise a lex
specialis governing the usage of shared natural resources. But they are
not the only relevant sources of public international law. International
human rights commitments apply extraterritorially under
circumstances that might be met by control over shared resources.
Certain international crimes may be committed by depriving
populations of vital resources. And action that results in an acute
resource shortage might be considered a use of force or an armed
attack for purposes of the UN Charter. This Part therefore considers
whether the mismanagement of shared natural resources might
constitute a breach of international obligations apart from ERU and
NSH.
A. International Human Rights Law
Human rights law typically protects individuals and
communities from abuses committed by their own governments.
Under certain circumstances, however, states may owe human rights
obligations to populations outside of their territory. In fact, with the
possible exception of the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”),51 the texts of human rights treaties rarely
explicitly confine themselves to the territorial boundaries of state
parties, but instead apply throughout the state’s jurisdiction.52
Jurisdiction may at times be extraterritorial, especially when a state
exercises some form of control over persons or property abroad or is
Alistair Rieu-Clarke, and Zeray Yihdego, eds., THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN
RENAISSANCE DAM AND THE NILE BASIN: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER COOPERATION (Routledge ed., 2018).
51
See Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign
Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 HARVARD INTL. L. J. 81, 108–11
(2015) (The ICCPR obligates state parties “to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the [ ] Convention.” International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 2(1). Notwithstanding the usage of the term
“territory,” some scholars have suggested that this article yet admits of
extraterritorial application.); see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, TO RESPECT AND TO
ENSURE: STATE OBLIGATIONS AND PERMISSIBLE DEROGATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Louis
Henkin, ed. 1981).
52
MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY 17–18 (Oxford 2011).
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otherwise in a position to influence the rights of non-citizens. States
sharing resources might attain to this level of control over the rights
potentialities of their neighbors. Specifically, one state’s utilization of
a shared resource has the potential to profoundly impact the human
rights to food, water, health, and life in other states reliant upon the
same resource.
This section presents four models representing the judicial and
scholarly treatment of the extraterritorial application of human rights
obligations and assesses their consequences for states sharing natural
resources. The first two models—effective control and personal
jurisdiction—do not seem like they would impose additional human
rights obligations upon states sharing natural resources, at least in their
current forms. On the other hand, the latter two approaches—negative
rights and functionalism—do lead to the application of extraterritorial
human rights law to transboundary resources.
1. Effective Control
According to one strand of jurisprudence, espoused in the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and the ICJ,53
human rights treaties apply in areas where state parties exercise
effective control, even if outside of national territory. The paradigmatic
example is a military occupation, though the standard for effective
control is not necessarily coterminous with the meaning of occupation
as codified in international humanitarian law.54 The threshold for
effective control is set relatively high, though still lower than the level
applicable within the state’s own territory and not necessarily
exclusive.55 In several cases examining whether or not a foreign state
had exerted effective control, the outcome has turned on whether it
exercised “public powers normally . . . exercised by a sovereign
government.”56

53

Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Judgment, para. 62 (Feb. 23,
1995); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, paras. 109–13 (July 9, 2004); Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, paras. 179,
216–17 (Dec. 19, 2005).
54
MILANOVIC, supra note 52, at 141–47.
55
Id. at 140–41, 147–51.
56
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Judgment, para. 135,
149 (July 7, 2011); Al-Saadoon v. Secretary of State for Defence, England and
Wales High Court 715, para. 74 (2015).

2021]

SHARED NATURAL RESOURCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

579

States sharing resources may command a considerable level of
control over the destinies of their neighbors. The construction of the
GERD, for example, may have catastrophic human rights
consequences in other riparian states. Recognizing this interrelation,
treaties governing the usage of transboundary resources often regulate
activities within a state party’s “jurisdiction or control” rather than
activities within its territory alone.57 In this context, “control” would
seem to denote a capacity to effect change by engaging in or refraining
from a certain activity with transboundary effects. This is not,
however, the meaning assigned to “effective control” in the realm of
human rights, where it is bound to a physical presence and the exercise
of government functions. Based on this standard, it is unlikely that a
state would be considered to have assumed effective control of foreign
territory simply by virtue of its sharing resources with another.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Another model for the extraterritorial application of human
rights law, embraced by several UN treaty bodies,58 the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights,59 and the ECtHR,60 is based
on control over persons rather than territory. Under this interpretation,
jurisdiction is founded upon “the relationship between the individual
and the State,” regardless of location.61 Authority over the individual
might derive from nationality, a custodial or some other special
relation, or an exercise of a legal power, though none of these criteria
sufficiently captures the full range of cases that would intuitively be
57

See, e.g. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, preamble (2003); General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 30 (Dec. 12, 1974), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3281(XXIX); UN Environment Programme, Draft Principles in the Field
of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious
Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, principle 3.1 (May
19, 1978), U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.6/CRP.2; Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, principle 2 (Aug. 12, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26.
58
Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.12/52, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/36/40),
176 (1981); Committee Against Torture, para. 16 (Jan. 24, 2008), General
Comment No. 2, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2.
59
Coard v. United States, Case No. 10.951, Report No. 109/99, para. 37;
Saldaño v. Argentina, Report No. 38/99, paras. 15–20.
60
Al-Skeini, supra note 56, at 137.
61
Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 56/1979, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/1,
92 (1984).
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included.62 As Professor Marko Milanovic observes, personal
jurisdiction tends to converge in practice with effective control as the
physical unit of analysis contracts in size to, for instance, a single
apartment building or detention facility.63
While it is true that in some sense resource-sharing states
“exercise[ ] control or authority over [ ] individual[s]” beyond their
borders,64 it once again does not appear to be the type of control
imagined in personal jurisdiction cases. In the jurisprudence of human
rights tribunals adopting this reasoning as the basis for jurisdiction,
there is always some form of direct and personalized contact between
the foreign state and the victim, whether from the individual entering
into state’s physical custody, becoming a target of a law enforcement
action, serving as a member of its the armed forces, setting foot into
embassy premises, or being subjected to a similar exercise of
authority.65 The case law does not support the extraterritorial
application of human rights law on a personal jurisdiction theory based
on a capacity to alter resource endowments.
3. Positive and Negative Rights
In human rights discourse, a distinction is commonly drawn
between positive and negative rights. Negative rights may only be
violated actively and are commonly associated with the ICCPR;
positive rights may be violated passively and are primarily tabulated
in the International Convention on Cultural, Economic, and Social
Rights (“ICESCR”).66 Critiquing the effective control and personal
jurisdiction models as vague to the point of serving no practical use,
Milanovic’s preferred formulation instead differentiates in treatment
between positive and negative human rights obligations. He argues
that, whereas the protection and fulfillment of positive human rights
may only be possible within regions of effective control, negative
human rights may be respected anywhere.67 Milanovic defends this
62

MILANOVIC, supra note 52, at 207-8.
Id. at 127–35.
64
Al-Skeini, supra note 56, at 137.
65
MILANOVIC, supra note 52, at 187–207.
66
David Jason Karp, What is the Responsibility to Respect Human Rights?
Reconsidering the ‘Respect, Protect, and Fulfill Framework, 12 INT’L THEORY 83,
88 (2020); Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1758, 1764 (2008).
67
Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 51, at 118–19.
63
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system as predictable, rational, and in line with the human rights ideals
of universality and effectiveness.68
Should Milanovic’s theory be adopted by human rights courts,
it would likely require imposing extraterritorial human rights
obligations upon states sharing natural resources. The first step in the
analysis would be to determine whether the right in question is positive
or negative. As Milanovic admits, this sorting is not always
straightforward, in part because some rights have both positive and
negative aspects.69 In Milanovic’s terms, these rights would therefore
bear both territorial and extraterritorial obligations. Take the right to
water, which is inferred from the general ICESCR rights to an
adequate standard of living and to the highest attainable standard of
health.70 According to the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), the right contains both “freedoms,” i.e.
negative components, and “entitlements,” i.e. positive components.71
Positive elements of the right to water include state obligations to
promote realization of and prevent outside interference with the
right.72 At the same time, states are themselves negatively bound by
prohibitions against impairing the right to water, including in other
states.73 A violation of this obligation, per the CESCR, includes the
“diminution of water resources affecting human health”74—possibly
by overuse of a shared water supply.
By the same token, the rights to food, health, and life include
an obligation that states refrain from conduct endangering their

68

Id. at 119.
MILANOVIC, supra note 52, at 222.
70
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art.
11–12, Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights]; Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, arts.
11, 12, para. 3 (Jan. 20, 2003), General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, UN
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11.
71
Id. para. 10.
72
See id paras. 23, 25–26; see also Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in
Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2204–209 (2013) (describing the
predominant approach to the right to water as a “provision right”).
73
See Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paras. 21, 31,
supra note 70; see also What Price for the Priceless?: Implementing the
Justiciability of the Right to Water, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1085–86 (2007)
(describing India’s negative rights approach).
74
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 44(a), supra
note 70.
69
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enjoyment domestically or abroad.75 The CESCR’s commentary on
the right to adequate food explicitly notes the need to adopt rightsoriented environmental policies “at both the national and international
levels.”76 Likewise, the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) takes note
of the threats to the rights to life posed by “[e]nvironmental
degradation, climate change, and unsustainable development.”77
Accordingly, it requires states to utilize natural resources sustainably
and enter into consultations with other states over activities likely to
significantly affect the environment.78 Collectively, this evidence
supports Milanovic’s framework by requiring resource-sharing states
to observe negative human rights transnationally.
4. Functionalism
Finding Milanovic’s negative-positive model at times arbitrary
and incomplete, Professor Yuval Shany instead puts forward a
functionalist approach: “states should protect human rights wherever
in the world they may operate, whenever they may reasonably do so.”79
The limiting principle that Shany proposes for this context-informed
understanding of jurisdiction is that “the potential impact of the act or
omission in question [must be] direct, significant, and foreseeable.”80
Thus, the failure to ameliorate hunger in a foreign state would not
ordinarily be a human rights violation, but directly contributing to or
75
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 11, para. 15,
36 (May 12, 1999), General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art.
11), UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5; Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, art. 12, para. 33, 39 (Aug. 11, 2000), General Comment No. 14: The Right
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4;
Human Rights Committee, art. 6, para. 7 (Sept. 3, 2019), General Comment No.
36: Article 6: Right to Life, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36.
76
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 11, para. 4,
supra note 75.
77
Human Rights Committee, art. 6, para. 62, supra note 75.
78
Id.
79
See Yuval Shany, Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional
Approach to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights, 7 L. & ETHICS OF
HUMAN RTS. 47, 67 (2013); see also Maria L. Banda, Regime Congruence:
Rethinking the Scope of State Responsibility for Transboundary Environmental
Harm, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1879, 1927–31 (2019) (positing a theory of
extraterritorial application of human rights based on their “direct effects”).
80
Id. at 68–9. See also Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 9(b)
(applying the scope of jurisdiction to “situations over which State acts or omissions
bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural
rights, whether within or outside its territory”).
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perhaps even tolerating the causes of global hunger might be.81
Conveying a concern for extending state human rights obligations too
far, Shany rejects the notion of imposing upon states overly onerous
duties, such as requiring them to send aid to foreign peoples or to halt
pollution altogether. The state acts and omissions in these examples,
writes Shany, are too causally attenuated from the harms.82
A functionalist perspective presents the clearest path to
imposing extraterritorial human rights duties upon states holding
transboundary resources. In his own exposition, Shany concludes
analogously that restricting the transnational supply of essential
resources such as gas or electricity would constitute human rights
violations.83 By virtue of geography, resource-sharing states are in a
position to reasonably affect the human rights climate in other states.
This would not mean that they could not exploit these resources for
themselves, but only that they must not dramatically alter the available
supply.
B. International Criminal Law
In addition to its human rights implications, the gross
mismanagement of shared resources may raise the specter of
international criminal liability. International law has for decades
grappled with how to assign accountability for environmental harms.
In preparing its Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, the ILC considered listing environmental damage as a crime
against humanity.84 Numerous commentators have argued in favor of
such a move85 and advocates have attempted unsuccessfully to prompt
81

Yuval Shany, Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to
Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights, 7 L. & ETHICS OF HUMAN RTS.
47, 68–9 (2013).
82
Id.; see also Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, para. 75 (Dec.
12, 2001) (holding that liability based purely on causality is “tantamount to arguing
that anyone adversely affected by any act imputable to a Contracting State,
wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its consequences felt, is
thereby brought within the jurisdiction of the State for the purpose of… [the
European Convention on Human Rights]”).
83
Shany, supra note 81, at 66–7.
84
Christian Tomuschat, Document on Crimes Against the Environment, 2
Y.B. OF THE INT’L L. COMM. 16, 18 (1996).
85
See generally, e.g. Anastacia Greene, The Campaign to Make Ecocicde
an International Crime: Quixotic Quest or Moral Imperative, 30 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 1 (2019); Caitlin Lambert, Environmental Destruction in Ecuador: Crimes
Against Humanity under the Rome Statute?, 30 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 707 (2017);
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the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) to open investigations into
instances of environmental degradation.86 In a policy paper published
in 2016, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor expressed interest in
prosecuting crimes related to the exploitation of natural resources and
the destruction of the environment.87 In furtherance of that initiative,
it is possible that egregious abuses of shared natural resources could
be punished under the Rome Statute as crimes against humanity or,
albeit less likely, as genocide.
1. Crimes against Humanity
The crimes against humanity of forcible transfer of population
and other inhumane acts are the closest matches to the harms
perpetrated by expropriation of natural resources. In extreme cases,
arguments might also be made for extermination and persecution. But
whether any state official will be held criminally liable for these acts
would likely depend on the application of the chapeau criteria for
crimes against humanity. Specifically, the inquiry hinges on whether
resource depletion can properly be considered an “attack” under
Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
i.

Contextual Factors

As defined in Article 7, a crime against humanity consists of
the commission of any of a set of specified acts “as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack.”88 An “attack” in this
context means “acts of violence,” though not necessarily via physical
violence or armed force.89 Indeed, several different classes of crimes
against humanity do not necessarily entail physical violence, such as
Audrey Crasson, The Case of Chevron in Ecuador: The Need for an International
Crime against the Environment?, 9 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 29 (2017).
86
Situation in Ecuador, Comm. (Oct. 2014).
87
Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and
Prioritisation, INT’L CRIM. CT. 3, 4 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/itemsdocuments/20160915_otp-policy_case-selection_eng.pdf (para. 7).
88
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute 1998].
89
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1, Trial Judgement,
para. 415 (Nov. 8, 1999); Elements of Crimes, INT’L CRIM. CT. 1, 5 (2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR96-4-T, Trial Judgement, para. 581 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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deportation, persecution, and apartheid. Courts have therefore broadly
construed “attack” as meaning “any mistreatment of the civilian
population”90 that “caus[es] physical or mental injury.”91 This may
include “exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular
manner.”92
Action that drastically alters resource allocations might
resemble other acts of deprivation that have been adjudged “attacks.”
Charges of crimes against humanity have been brought before the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) for the
denial of access to food, water, medical care, shelter, and sanitation
facilities to prisoners.93 Transboundary harms accomplished through a
reduction in natural resources appear somewhat different from these
cases because the affected population is not within the physical control
or custody of the aggressor per se. But the statutory language and case
law give little indication that such a distinction is necessarily relevant.
Moreover, the crime against humanity of extermination is explicitly
defined in the Rome Statute to include “the deprivation of access to
food and medicine” under prescribed conditions.94
To qualify as a crime against humanity, the “attack” must also
be committed “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy.” The ICC has held that such a policy may be deduced from
“repeated actions occurring according to the same sequence, or the
existence of preparations or collective mobilization orchestrated and
coordinated by the State or organization.”95 State decisions related to
natural resource utilization would almost inevitably be formed on the
basis of policy. However, the Rome Statute describes an attack not as
a singular event, but as a “course of conduct” comprised of multiple
90
Nahimana, Appeal Judgement, para. 916 (Nov. 28, 2007) (citing
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Appeal Judgement, para. 86 (June
12, 2002)).
91
Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39, Trial Judgement, para. 706
(Mar. 1, 2002).
92
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, para.
581 (Sept. 2, 1998).
93
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Judgement, para.
54 (Nov. 29, 2002); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and
Judgment, para. 707 (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S,
Sentencing Judgement, para. 69 (Dec. 18, 2003).
94
Rome Statute 1998, art. 7(2)(b), supra note 88.
95
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, para. 1109 (Mar. 7,
2014) (Judgement pursuant to article 74 of the Statute.).
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distinct acts.96 Courts have likewise generally understood crimes
against humanity to refer to patterns of repeated violence, as opposed
to isolated incidents,97 and have consequently required a nexus
between each individual act and the broader attack.98 This approach
has received no shortage of criticism, with many commentators
preferring to focus on the magnitude of the harm caused rather than
the quantity of discrete acts involved.99 Nonetheless, under the
prevailing interpretation, the construction and filling of a dam like the
GERD would not amount to an “attack” were it to be considered one
continuous act. On the other hand, this “act” is unlike many others
because it would take place over the course of years and conceptually
could be subdivided into smaller acts corresponding to the various
stages of construction and filling.
If transboundary resource harms can be recognized as an
“attack” at all, there is a good chance that they will satisfy the other
contextual elements for crimes against humanity. The term
“widespread” “connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and the
number of targeted persons.”100 “Systematic” refers to planning and
direction, and may be inferred when the attack is pursuant to a state
policy.101 An attack is “directed against [the] civilian population” if
noncombatants are the “primary object,” considering a number of
Rome Statute 1998, art. 7(2)(a), supra note 98 (defining “attack directed
against any civilian population” as “a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of [qualifying] acts…”).
97
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 11 (Nov. 14, 1995)
(Decision on the Form of the Indictment); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR2000-55A-T, Trial Judgement, para. 512 (Sept. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Gbagbo,
Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, para. 215 (June 12, 2014) (Decision on the
confirmation of charges.).
98
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, para. 97–8
(Mar. 31, 2010) (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya.).
99
Chile Eboe-Osuji, Crimes Against Humanity: Directing Attacks Against
a Civilian Population, 2 AFR. J. L. STUD. 118, 120 (2008); Mohamed Elewa Badar,
From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of
Crimes against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 73, 106–07 (2004).
100
Prosecutor v. Harun and Kushayb, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, para.
62 (Apr. 27, 2007) (Decision on the Prosecution Application under Art. 58(7) of
the Statute) (citing Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A,
Appeals Judgement, para. 94 (Dec. 17, 2004)).
101
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Judgement,
para. 98 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, para.
396 (Sept. 30, 2008) (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, para. 580 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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different factors.102 Essentially, civilians are the primary object of an
attack when the population at large is intentionally targeted.103 As for
the mens rea, the perpetrator must have knowledge of the attack and
that his or her acts are a part of it.104 Anyone involved in something
like a dam project would automatically have knowledge of the attack
when the attack is the dam itself.
ii.

Substantive Offenses

If able to clear the preliminary hurdles outlined above, an
extreme appropriation of shared natural resources may amount to the
crimes against humanity of forcible transfer of population, other
inhumane acts, extermination, or persecution. Depending on the facts,
the first three might reasonably be charged provided that the
perpetrator acted with knowledge or intent, which may be inferred if
the consequences were foreseeable.105 Because the environmental
impacts of development projects are often disputed, however, it may
be difficult to conclusively show that a responsible official was fully
aware that it would result in death, displacement, or other severe harm.
Attribution of mens rea might be made simpler when harms take more
immediate effect, such as flooding occasioned by the filling of a dam,
rather than those that are more gradual, such as environmental
degradation or long-term over-utilization.
As discussed in more detail below, the crime against humanity
of persecution has a unique mens rea element that makes it unlikely to
apply to the mismanagement of shared resources. With this exception,
the remainder of this section will consider only the respective elements
of actus reus.
a. Forcible Transfer
The loss of access to vital resources can force mass migration;
some estimates suggest that as much as one-third of Egypt’s
102

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 101, para. 91.
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, para. 81 (Mar.
31, 2010) (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya.);
Chile Eboe-Osuji, supra note 99, at 122–24.
104
See Prosecutor v. Blakic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgement, para.
247 (Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR0951-T, Trial Judgement, para. 133 (May 21, 1999).
105
Rome Statute 1998, art. 30, supra note 88.
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population could be displaced by the GERD.106 In the aftermath of
such an occurrence, a strong case could be made out for a charge of
forcible transfer of population based on the jurisprudence of
international tribunals.
Importantly for this analysis, physical force is not required to
commit the crime of forcible transfer. Instead, the impetus for
displacement “may include threat of force or coercion, such as that
caused by… duress… or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment.”107 The ICTY has interpreted the crime to mean creating
conditions such that flight becomes necessary for survival, leaving
victims without a “genuine choice.”108 This may be accomplished by
the imposition of “severe living conditions” that disturb the victims’
right to be able to remain in their homes and communities, including
the deprivation of food and water.109 Removal of a civilian population
through these or any other means is only permitted under international
law for the protection of the population or when mandated by military
necessity,110 neither of which would excuse the misuse of shared
resources in ordinary circumstances.
b. Other Inhumane Acts
Disrupting the supply of natural resources could also be
prosecuted as the catchall crime against humanity for “other inhumane
acts of a similar character” to those explicitly enumerated in the Rome
Statute.111 The ICTY has indicated that the deprivation of sustenance
would meet this standard by regarding it as functionally commensurate
with other crimes against humanity.112 Several different international
David Hearst, How Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam Became Egypt’s
Nakba, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/egypts-nakba-ethiopia-dam-nile-sisi.
107
Elements of Crimes, supra note 89, at 6 (Fn. 12).
108
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgement, para. 530
(Aug. 2, 2001).
109
Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Appeals Judgement,
para. 319 (Mar. 17, 2009) (citing Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T,
Trial Judgement, para. 729 (Sept. 27, 2006)).
110
Prosecutor v. Nuon and Khieu, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC,
Trial Judgement, para. 155 (Aug. 7, 2014).
111
Rome Statute 1998, art. 7(1)(k), supra note 88.
112
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16, Trial Judgement, para.
631 (Jan. 14, 2000) (“Such an attack on property in fact constitutes a destruction of
the livelihood of a certain population. This may have the same inhumane
consequences as a forcible transfer or deportation.”). See also Prosecutor v.
106
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tribunals have likewise construed the failure to provide for adequate
living conditions to detainees, including sufficient food and water, as
an inhumane act.113 Again, these cases differ from transboundary harm
to resources because of the custodial relationship, but there is no
jurisprudential cause to believe that difference is legally salient.
Moreover, the Rome Statute names “starvation of civilians as a method
of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their
survival” as a war crime in international armed conflicts,114 suggesting
that a loss of essential resources is considered a very grave harm.
c. Extermination
A perpetrator may be guilty of the crime against humanity of
extermination if he or she kills one or more persons as part of a mass
killing.115 To apply to natural resource depletion, this would require a
factual showing that the allegedly criminal utilization caused the death
of “a numerically significant part of the population concerned.”116 If
this result does occur, extermination would be an appropriate charge
in recognition of the colossal scale of the crime.117 Moreover, as noted
above, the Rome Statute definition expressly lists “deprivation of
access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction
of part of a population” as one method of extermination.118 While the
word “calculated” would seem to require some additional showing of
scienter, under the Rome Statute intent may be imputed constructively
when the resulting consequence was foreseeable to the actor.119
d. Persecution

Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-I, Indictment, para. 24.1 (Nov. 4, 1994) (charging the
defendant with a crime against humanity for “participating in humane acts”
including “providing inadequate food” and “providing living conditions failing to
meet minimal basic standards”).
113
Prosecutor v. Leite, Case No. 04a/2001, Judgement, para. 156–62
(Dec. 7, 2002); Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Trial Judgement, vol. 3,
para. 1059–67 (May 29, 2013); Prosecutor v. Nuon and Khieu, Case No. 002/1909-2007/ECCC/TC, Trial Judgement, para. 456–58 (Aug. 7, 2014).
114
Rome Statute 1998, art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), supra note 88.
115
Elements of Crimes, supra note 89, at 6.
116
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgement, para. 502
(Aug. 2, 2001); see also Elements of Crimes, supra note 89, at 5 (Fn. 7, 6).
117
David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
245, 273 (2003).
118
Rome Statute 1998, art. 7(2)(b), supra note 88.
119
Id. art. 30(2)(b).
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Unlike other crimes against humanity, persecution is a crime
of specific intent, involving the illegal deprivation of one or more
fundamental rights on the basis of group identity.120 One of these
protected identities is nationality, allowing for the possibility of
charging state actors with persecution for acts that disproportionately
harm citizens of another state. Not only must the perpetrator be aware
of the discriminatory effects of his or her action, he or she “must
consciously intend to discriminate,” with discriminatory intent serving
as a significant, if not primary, motive.121 In the related context of
genocide, specific intent may be discerned from “the general political
doctrine which gave rise to the acts… or the repetition of destructive
and discriminatory acts.”122 The element of intent probably makes
persecution an inapt fit for resource malfeasance. Given the benefits
of resource exploitation to the acting state’s own population, it seems
unlikely that discrimination against other dependent populations
would be counted among the driving motives for it.
2. Genocide
The crime of genocide differs from crimes against humanity in
several respects. First, it does not require that the subject acts be
committed as part of an “attack,”123 eliminating the difficulties with
defining abuses of shared resources as such. Like the crime against
humanity of persecution, genocide is also a crime of specific intent,
concerning only those acts which are “committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group.”124 While the inclusion of nationality makes it possible that
genocide would apply to resource utilizations that harm only foreign
populations, it again seems unlikely that the primary motives for such
policies would be genocidal rather than economical, especially in light
of general recognition for the right to development.125 If they were,
however, then state actors responsible for reducing the availability of
120
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resources in other states might be charged with genocide if it resulted
in injuries including death or serious bodily or mental harm.
C. The UN Charter and General Principles of International Law
As the GERD has neared completion, sabers have been rattling
in Egypt with increasing intensity,126 illustrating the risk of resource
disputes escalating into armed conflict. In 2013, top Egyptian
politicians were caught on tape discussing the possibilities of an
airstrike on the dam or of arming Ethiopian rebel groups.127 In 2020,
Egypt-based hackers launched a cyberattack on Ethiopian government
websites.128 Not long after, Ethiopia banned flights over the GERD as
a defensive precaution,129 with Donald Trump further stoking fears by
suggesting that Egypt might “blow up” the dam.130
While the UN Charter broadly forbids member states from
threatening or actually using force against other states,131 it allows for
a few exceptions. One is for action authorized by the Security
Council,132 which has in fact issued numerous resolutions concerning
access to resources during or following armed conflict.133 Another is
Article 51 of the Charter, which grants states “the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence” against an “armed attack”
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launched by another state.134 If not rising to the level of an “armed
attack,” aggrieved states might nonetheless respond to an unlawful use
of force by appealing to the principle of necessity or by imposing
countermeasures.
1. Uses of Force
The UN Charter obliges member states to refrain from “the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”135 While there is no authoritative
definition for the “use of force,” purely political or economic coercion
would not necessarily suffice.136 On the other hand, the force need not
be physical or military in nature. Uses of force are instead
distinguished from other hostile acts by their “scale and effects.”137
The quantitative dimension of the force is thus weighted more strongly
than its qualitative character.
The advent of cybercrime has prompted a rethinking of “uses
of force,” particularly those which do not take kinetic form. The
Tallinn Manual, the leading treatise on the application of international
law in cyberspace, promulgates a non-exhaustive set of criteria to
determine when a cyber operation amounts to a use of force. Most
important among them is the severity of the impact registered.138 Other
factors include a) immediacy, b) causal directness, c) invasiveness, d)
measurability of effects, e) military character, f) state involvement, and
g) presumptive legality.139 According to the Tallinn Manual, any
action that causes death, injury, or property damage automatically
meets this test.140
134
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The application of the Tallinn factors to misappropriations of
transboundary resources depends upon the type of resource and the
type of utilization, particularly with respect to the severity, immediacy,
causation, and measurability. Downstream harms caused by the
GERD, for instance, would seem to score highly on these metrics,
whereas minor disturbances in the balance may not. In some sense,
property damage is inflicted by the very fact of one state’s
overconsumption of a common resource. Certainly, human harms may
be inflicted as well, though it may be difficult to demonstrate causality.
i.

Self-Defense

Some states, including the United States, maintain that there is
no difference between an Article 2(4) “use of force” and an Article 51
“armed attack.”141 The majority view, however, is that these terms
differ in degree. The most authoritative judicial guidance remains the
ICJ’s 1986 judgement in Nicaragua v. US, where it construed “armed
attack” as meant to signify “the most grave forms of the use of
force.”142
Notwithstanding the canon of construction that a treaty term is
to be interpreted “in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning,”143 an
“armed attack,” like a “use of force,” is generally treated as a gravity
threshold rather than as literally requiring the use of military means
and methods.144 In its advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons,
the ICJ pronounced that Article 51 applies to “any use of force,
141
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regardless of the weapons employed.”145 By this view, any act causing
significant loss of life or property damage may constitute an “armed
attack.”146 The expert drafters of the Tallinn Manual also considered
severe damage to critical infrastructure to qualify.147 In addition to its
human costs, severe depletion of a vital resource might be akin to
disabling critical infrastructure.
Textual strictures once again notwithstanding,148 the notion of
anticipatory self-defense is widely accepted today, even though Article
51 seemingly applies only to armed attacks which have already
occurred. According to the approach favored by the Tallinn Manual,
this doctrine permits states to respond in self-defense to an imminent
armed attack at the “last feasible window of opportunity.”149 This
standard is not strictly temporal, but rather a contextual evaluation of
the state’s ability to effectively defend itself. In the case of the GERD,
Egypt’s right to anticipatory self-defense might begin at a moment
when negotiations had failed and Ethiopia was preparing to fill the dam
in a manner that would undeniably and irreversibly cause severe future
harm.
ii.

Necessity

Even if it is not registered as an “armed attack,” a state
enduring a loss of natural resources owing to a neighbor’s wrongdoing
would not be without options. It might invoke the principle of
necessity, which entitles aggrieved states to commit otherwise
wrongful acts as a last resort in order to “safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril,” provided that in doing so they do
not impair the essential interests of other states.150 While the term is
intended to apply only to “exceptional cases,”151 presumably
145
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 39 (July 8).
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Karl Zemanek, Armed Attack, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Pub. Int’l
L., para. 21 (Oct. 2013).
147
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150
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G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
151
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impending environmental harms would meet that high threshold.
Moreover, the ICJ has held that the perilous effects are considered
imminent once the causes are in motion, even if there is a gap in time
or if the extent of the coming harm has not been clearly established.152
A plea of necessity thus bears some resemblance to the
meaning of self-defense under customary international law, in which
it is treated as an inherent right even in the absence of an armed
attack.153 The Caroline incident, which is frequently referred to as the
foundation for this view, was in fact treated at the time as a case of
necessity rather than self-defense.154 However, it is not clear that the
modern understanding of necessity would abide a use of force;155
indeed, the customary interpretation of self-defense is today the
minority position.156 Furthermore, necessity may only excuse action
that does not impair the essential interest of another state. Even if
abused, the sovereign rights to development and to the utilization of
natural resources are likely essential interests that might be harmed by
the counteraction of injured states.
2. Countermeasures
Countermeasures present another potential response to the
misuse of shared natural resources. They allow an injured state to
breach its international obligations respecting a state which has
committed an internationally wrongful act in order to induce a return
to compliance.157 But a number of restrictions on the usage of
countermeasures diminish their practicality in the context of resource
disputes. For one, countermeasures, unlike self-defense, may not be
invoked prospectively; they may only be implemented in response to

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7,
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an ongoing violation.158 They also must be proportional, nonescalatory, and generally reversible.159 Countermeasures may not
include the threat or actual use of force and they must cease when the
responsible state restores compliance.160 Countermeasures may be a
particularly ineffectual option for smaller states with limited means to
apply political or economic pressure against wrongdoers even if
restrictively licensed to flout international obligations.161
III.

SHARED RESOURCES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

Examining shared natural resources through the lenses of
international human rights law, international criminal law, and the UN
Charter promotes the development of the law in two distinct ways.
First, it can provide guidance to the adjudication of natural resource
disputes by adding content to the blurry ERU and NSH concepts. At
the least, it would seem that a utilization could hardly be considered
“equitable and reasonable” if it violated an international duty. The fact
of such a violation might also bear on the “significance” of the harm
inflicted.
Second, the application of international human rights law,
international criminal law, and the law of use of force to cases of
competition over shared resources should prompt further
reconsideration of the limitations of the classical forms of each of these
bodies of law and their capacity to accommodate nontraditional threat
vectors. To a certain extent, all have already begun to adapt to an era
in which states face dangers that materialize outside of their
jurisdictions. With global warming likely to intensify competition over
resources, the urgency of this evolution is continually ascending.
A. Development of the Law Concerning Shared Natural
Resources

158
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A recognition of the consequences of competition over
transboundary resources for international human rights law,
international criminal law, and the UN Charter can lead to a fuller
apprehension of the “equitable and reasonable” standard. While
reasonableness is not synonymous with legality, unlawful conduct is
unquestionably unreasonable.162 Thus, resource utilizations that
violate other international obligations would presumptively not be
found “equitable and reasonable” and may cause “significant harm.”
A multidisciplinary legal analysis that places the ERU and
NSH principles in the context of broader international law can
therefore assist in the evaluation of a given utilization of a shared
resource. The violation of a human rights norm or a criminal statute
should be accounted for in any assessment grounded in international
environmental law. In particular, shared resource utilization policies
should be appraised based on their impacts on the rights to food, water,
health, and life and the international criminal exposure of acting
officials. Similarly, the Tallinn factors can provide guidance as to
when a certain resource utilization amounts to an unlawful use of
force, supplying further evidence as to its reasonableness. When a
resource-sharing state does breach an international norm, affected
states may consider the proportional responses available to them
through self-defense, necessity, or countermeasures.
Reading the ERU and NSH principles alongside other bodies
of international law is also justified as a juridical matter. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties instructs that international
agreements are to be interpreted in light of “any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”163
For shared natural resources, this exercise is facilitated by the mutual
compatibility of the relevant legal regimes.164 Consideration of rules
protecting civilian populations is also in keeping with the purpose of
treaties governing shared natural resources, which commonly place
human needs at their center.165
162
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B. Development of Other Areas of Law
Despite its potentially monumental consequences for each, the
misuse of shared natural resources pushes the prescriptive limits of
international human rights law, international criminal law, and the UN
Charter. In doing so, it underscores the need for further legal
development across three different issue areas. First, it should further
spur the evolution and progression of theories of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in human rights and criminal law. Second, transboundary
resources stand as vivid examples of how the human rights objectives
of one state can be at the expense of human rights in another state,
necessitating a means of reconciliation. Third, appreciation of this
class of transboundary harm begs further elucidation as to the forms of
non-kinetic action that may be considered “attacks” under the Rome
Statute and “uses of force” under the UN Charter.
1. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Shared natural resources test the jurisdictional boundaries of
international human rights law and international criminal law. As
described above, the jurisdictional models based on spatial and
personal control favored by human rights tribunals are a poor fit for
transboundary harms. This realization should provide further support
for the movement to abandon these antiquated paradigms in exchange
for a more flexible framework. In international criminal law, the
expansion of universal jurisdiction and recent extraterritorial
applications of the Rome Statute present paths to criminalizing
transboundary harms.
i.

Human Rights: Functionalism Bounded by Causal and
Quantitative Limits

The alternative jurisdiction approaches put forward by
Milanovic and Shany both mark potential new directions that would
better capacitate human rights law to address transboundary harms.
Under Milanovic’s negative rights theory, resource-sharing states
would be obligated to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of
on the Law of the Sea, art. 146, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (“the protection
of human life”); Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat, preamble (Feb. 2, 1971) (“the interdependence of man and his
environment”).

2021]

SHARED NATURAL RESOURCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

599

human rights extraterritorially. And according to Shany’s
functionalism, states would be obligated to avert human rights
violations of all types to the extent that they are capable. But both of
these frameworks are in want of a limiting principle—how far must
states go in advancing human rights beyond their borders? In a
globalized world, domestic policymaking frequently has international
human rights consequences, especially on environmental issues. Some
standard is required to distinguish permissible resource utilizations
with tolerable transboundary effects from other resource utilizations
that unlawfully imperil human rights in neighboring states.
Shany proposes drawing the line on extraterritorial human
rights responsibilities at harms that are “direct, significant, and
foreseeable.”166 Fittingly, this equation incorporates both causal and
quantitative variables and employs terms that are well-defined in
international law. Accounting for the quantum of harm in this context
is appropriate because in both treaty and customary law regarding
transboundary environmental harms, sic utere tolerates a minimum
threshold of damage.167 As noted above, “significant” harms may be
less severe than “serious” or “substantial” harms.168
Causal attribution in international law is context-dependent
and may vary according to the purpose of the rule that has been
breached and the intention of the offending state.169 “Direct” is often
associated with factual causality, for which international tribunals
commonly apply a but-for test.170 That is, the cause must be necessary
for the effect. “Foreseeability” instead refers to legal causality and is
linked to the proximity or remoteness of harm.171 It is evaluated based
on what was known to the actor at the time of the conduct. 172 Taken
166
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together, “direct, significant, and foreseeable” serves as a logical and
workable scheme that would allow international human rights law to
address transboundary harms without imposing undue burdens upon
states.
ii.

Criminal Law: Universal Jurisdiction and the Rome
Statute

The possibility that the gross misuse of transboundary
resources could amount to an international crime also challenges the
reach of international criminal law. Traditionally, international law
recognizes criminal jurisdiction based on territory, nationality, or some
other tie to the state.173 However, numerous international treaties make
special jurisdictional allowances for offenses with which the state may
have no relation. These include crimes such as genocide,174 war
crimes,175 and torture176 which are considered so grave as to offend all
of humanity, rendering the perpetrators hostes humani generis. It also
includes crimes that are transnational in nature and contravene the law
of nations (delicta juris gentium), such as piracy,177 terrorism,178

173
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hostage-taking,179 currency counterfeiting,180 drug trafficking,181 and
airplane hijacking.182 These conventions generally require member
states to investigate and either prosecute or extradite culprits that may
be present within their jurisdiction, even if they otherwise have no
connection to the crime.
Despite its transboundary implications, no treaty imposes
similar obligations upon states to punish crimes against the natural
environment as delicta juris gentium. However, many states have
embraced the principle of universal jurisdiction in their domestic law,
enabling them to prosecute international crimes under domestic law
without a jurisdictional hook.183 At the international level, the ICC
implicitly recognized that crimes against humanity may be committed
transnationally in its 2019 authorization of an investigation into the
situation in Bangladesh and Myanmar. In that decision, the Court held
that it may take jurisdiction when any part of the criminal conduct
occurs within the territory of a state party.184 This ruling lays the
groundwork for future extraterritorial applications of the Rome
Statute, such as for crimes against humanity occasioned by resource
deprivation.
2. Conflict of Human Rights
Interstate competition over shared natural resources may bring
human rights into conflict. For example, the fulfillment of the right to
development in one state by exploitation of a transboundary resource
may obstruct the rights to food, water, and other related rights in
another state. International human rights law does not stipulate a clear
method for resolving this tension, which undermines its aspirations to
179
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the universality and mutual compatibility of rights.185 Rather,
practitioners are left to construct ad hoc standards based on a balancing
of the interests.186
The German Constitutional Court has innovated a model for
reaching compromise in these situations called “practical
concordance.” It entails a weighing of several different factors: a) the
impact or degree of harm to the right, b) the centrality of the harm to
the interests protected by the right, c) the involvement of additional
rights, d) the effect on a general interest bearing on human rights, e)
the alignment of the invocation of the right with the right’s intended
purpose, and f) the objective fairness of the manner in which the right
has been exercised.187 The relative importance of these factors depends
on the context.
Another means of resolving rights conflicts would be to
differentiate between the distinct responsibilities to respect, protect,
and fulfill human rights. The responsibility to respect is the state’s
obligation to “refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment
of human rights;” protection of human rights requires the state to
defend against abuses committed by third parties; to fulfill human
rights the state “must take positive action to facilitate the[ir]
enjoyment.”188 This tripartite framework is not enshrined in treaty law;
in fact, many human rights treaties do not explicitly mention an
obligation to respect at all.189 However, it has been widely referenced
by the CESCR and represents the standard modern understanding.190
The notions of respect, protection, and fulfillment of human
rights were conceived by the UN in order to remedy the “false
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dichotomy” between negative and positive rights.191 The different
duties instead exist on a spectrum between negative and positive
obligations, with respect primarily demanding restraint and fulfillment
mandating remedial action.192 Recalling Milanovic’s insight that, from
a functionalist perspective, it is easier for states to ensure negative
rights,193 it is therefore also true that it is usually easier for states to
respect human rights than to protect or fulfill them.
Not only are states better-positioned to respect human rights as
a practical matter, but their duty to respect may be stronger than the
duties to protect or fulfill. The concept of respect for human rights as
a distinct imperative originates in a libertarian impulse to minimize
state meddling in the private sphere.194 Political predilections toward
this laissez-faire ideology among powerful states have led to the
elevation of the duty to respect above the duties to protect and fulfill.195
When rights are in conflict, obligations stemming from the duty to
respect might therefore weigh heavier than those arising from the
responsibilities to protect and fulfill. Thus, a duty not to cause
environmental harm might overpower a conflicting duty to promote
economic development.
3. Non-Kinetic Force
Lastly, an appreciation for the damage that may be inflicted by
the misappropriation of shared natural resources should further
stimulate debate over how international criminal law and the UN
Charter regulate non-kinetic action. In particular, the term “attack” as
employed by the Rome Statute in the definition of crimes against
humanity and the terms “use of force” and “armed attack” in Articles
2 and 51 of the UN Charter have undergone an evolution in meaning
in response to developments in the modern threat frontier. Many of the
most menacing risks today—from climate change to cyber warfare to
disease—are not strictly military or physical. Deciding when these
perils will be considered “attacks” or “uses of force” under
international law will be a critical and ongoing project for the
international community in the decades to come. The benchmarks set
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forth in the Tallinn Manual represent an invaluable contribution in this
endeavor.
CONCLUSION
The mismanagement of shared natural resources may have
acute consequences for international human rights law, international
criminal law, and the UN Charter’s provisions on the use of force.
Depending on the operative theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it
may threaten the rights to food, water, health, and life. In extreme
cases, it may amount to a crime against humanity. And it may be an
illegal use of force potentially justifying responsive action by
aggrieved states. Apprehension of these legal implications in realms
beyond environmental law can assist in the determination of which
utilizations ought to be considered “equitable and reasonable.”
Moreover, the risk of transboundary harm caused by the short-sighted
or cynical expropriation of shared resources calls for juridical reforms
that would enable a comprehensive international-law response.
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